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Abstract
Within the context of an ‘affective turn’ in media studies and the social sciences, this article explores the methodological
challenges of researching emotions when studying online videos of conflict. Our study focuses on videos of the Syrian con-
flict shared on YouTube by the Russian state funded international broadcaster, RT.We propose that the concept of affective
investment is a useful pivot between online videos of conflict and audience responses to them. Our study interrogates the
role that affective investments play in 1) RT’s YouTube representations of the Syrian conflict, and 2) audience comments
on these videos. We draw attention to the important intersections of RT’s representations of the conflict and audiences’
affective investments in those representations, and draw attention to the methodological issues raised. Our empirical fo-
cus is two critical junctures in the Syrian conflict: the commencement of Russia’s military intervention; and following the
announcement of plans to withdraw Russian troops. We conclude by discussing the utility of affective investments in war
when assessing online coverage of conflict, and suggesting avenues for further development.
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1. Introduction
The affective turn in social sciences, media, and com-
munication has seen increased engagement with the
study of emotions (Ahmed, 2014; Clough & Halley, 2007;
Crawford, 2000; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Harding &
Pribram, 2009; Lünenborg & Maier, 2018; Massumi,
2015; Wetherell, 2012). In parallel, politicians, media
pundits, and publics increasingly describe emotions as
integral to the age of ‘post truth’ politics, or suggest
that emotions and feelings have becomemore significant
than rationality and facts in people’s political decision-
making (Crilley, 2018; Crilley & Chatterje-Doody, 2018;
Davies, 2018). Nevertheless, emotions have always been
important in global politics, media and society: the nov-
elty of the ‘post-truth’ age is the widespread recognition
of this fact. Despite this, and despite the burgeoning liter-
ature on emotions and global politics (Åhäll, 2018; Åhäll
& Gregory, 2015; Bleiker & Hutchison, 2008; Clément
& Sangar, 2018; Fierke, 2013; Hutchison, 2016; Ross,
2013), there remain difficulties in both understanding
how exactly emotions matter, and in methodologically
analysing them. In light of this, we suggest that the study
of online content can reveal the dynamics by which emo-
tions and affect shape people’s understandings of global
politics and society. We build on the concept of ‘affec-
tive investments’ (Solomon, 2014), proposing a method-
ology that links analysis of how war is represented on so-
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cial media with analysis of how audiences express emo-
tions in response to these representations. Our focus is
on YouTube videos of the Syrian conflict published by RT
(formerly Russia Today) as well as 600 comments made
on these videos by YouTube users.
How can social media content be studied in or-
der to unpack the role of emotions in people’s under-
standings of war? In order to answer this, we first out-
line the nascent literature on emotions, affect and war.
We build upon the concept of ‘affective investments’
(Solomon, 2014) in media representations of war, out-
lining a methodology for studying affective investments
in war on social media within both 1) the content of so-
cial media posts, and 2) comments made in response to
these posts. Our methodology draws upon the study of
discourse and emotions, and provides a three step frame-
work of analysis for studying emotions and war on social
media platforms. Our article provides two contributions:
first, it proposes a framework for understanding how af-
fective investments and war can be studied on social me-
dia, and proposes avenues for further development. Sec-
ond, it provides empirical demonstration of the impor-
tance of affective investments in RT’s media representa-
tion of the Syrian conflict.
2. Theorising Affective Investments in War
The unity implied by an affective turn (Clough & Halley,
2007) masks ‘diverse and thoroughly different concep-
tions and approaches’ (Lünenborg &Maier, 2018, p. 1) to
the study of emotions across the social sciences. Schol-
ars rarely agree on definitions of emotion and affect,
or how to study them. Approaches range from the psy-
chological, focused on biological expressions of emo-
tion and affect using techniques developed in psychol-
ogy and neuroscience; to the cultural, which view emo-
tion not as something internal to the body but as ‘so-
cial and cultural practices’ (Ahmed, 2014, p. 9). Such cul-
tural approaches have been simultaneously influential in
the study of media and communication (Doveling, Von
Scheve, & Konijn, 2010; Lünenborg &Maier, 2018; Wirth
& Schramm, 2005) and international politics and security
(Åhäll, 2018; Åhäll & Gregory, 2015; Bleiker & Hutchison,
2008; Hutchison, 2016; Solomon, 2014; Steele, 2007).
Synergizing and building upon these multidisciplinary
foundations, we propose a method that scholars from
diverse traditions can apply to study emotion on social
media platforms in the context of war.
A cultural approach to emotion often refers to three
interrelated terms. Affect is a bodily sensation that hap-
pens prior to and beyond consciousness (Clément &
Sangar, 2018, p. 5; Hutchison, 2016, p. 16); exempli-
fied by hairs standing on end, crying, or a faster heart-
beat. Emotions, in contrast, are intersubjective, culturally
formed understandings and experiences of physiological
change (Crawford, 2000, p. 125; Mercer, 2014, p. 516).
Feelings, then, are the ‘conscious awareness that one
is experiencing an emotion’ (Mercer, 2014, p. 516), and
whilst one may internally attribute hairs standing on end
as a feeling of fear, crying as sadness, or a faster heart-
beat as excitement, the meaning attributed to them
is culturally formed (Ahmed, 2014). Despite these dis-
tinctions, emotion and affect represent porous points
along a continuum rather than binary categories (Ahmed,
2014, p. 207; Crawford, 2000; Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014;
Mercer, 2014), and we therefore draw both upon the
concept of ‘affective investments’ (Solomon, 2014) and
upon expressed understandings of emotion.
Sara Ahmed’s work provides an avenue into study-
ing emotions in media and communication. Her analy-
sis is focused on ‘reading texts that circulate in the pub-
lic domain, which work by aligning subjects with col-
lectives by attributing “others” as the “source” of our
feelings’ (Ahmed, 2014, p. 1). By studying media as
texts and analysing how they represent emotions, schol-
ars have provided a variety of insights into emotions
and global politics by drawing upon interpretive meth-
ods, with discourse analysis being particularly promi-
nent (Åhäll, 2018; Åhäll & Gregory, 2015; Eroukhmanoff
& Fazendeiro, 2018; Hast, 2018; Hutchison & Bleiker,
2014; Koschut, 2018; Ross, 2013; Van Rythoven, 2015;
Solomon, 2012). Emma Hutchison offers a clear artic-
ulation of what this approach involves, arguing that
emotions should be studied ‘through representations,
through the words and images in which emotions are
expressed and in turn imbued with social meaning’
(Hutchison, 2016, p. 18). Ultimately, representations
are the closest one can get to apprehending emo-
tions, because ‘the internal, ephemeral nature of emo-
tions precludes the possibility of understanding them
through anything other than their instrumental display’
(Hutchison, 2016, p. 18). Representations ‘evoke feelings
and affects, which in turn help to shape how one per-
ceives of and belongs in the world’ (Hutchison, 2016,
p. 19). Representations therefore have social, political,
and cultural significance, shaping how people think, feel,
and act in the world.
To date however, there has been little progress in
linking such emotive media representations with audi-
ences’ displays of emotion, in part because of the many
methodological challenges for studying emotions, partic-
ularly in the context of war and conflict (Åhäll & Gregory,
2015, pp. 229–231). Scholars interested in the intersec-
tions of media, communication, emotions, and war have
drawn attention to the importance of ‘emotive media’
in conflict (Robinson, 2005, p. 344; see also Maltby &
Keeble, 2007; Zollman, 2017); theorized that war report-
ing that features ‘emotive and graphic coverage’ has
greater influence over policymakers (Robinson, 2002,
p. 25); studied how ‘suffering is portrayed on screen
and how the suffering is narrated’ (Chouliaraki, 2008,
p. 3; see also Sontag, 2003); and explored how lives are
visually represented as grievable or not (Butler, 2009;
Hutchison, 2016). Yet, whilst media representations of
emotion are undoubtedly important, we contend that
in the age of social media, so too is how audiences ex-
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press their emotions in online comments responding
to media representations of war. Within this environ-
ment, media actors, host platforms and audiences (and
the processes of interaction and circulation between
them) all actively shape discourses, values and norms
(Chatterje-Doody & Crilley, 2019, p. 81; Poulsen, Kvale, &
Van Leeuwen, 2018). Thus, online comments produce in-
teractions, commentary and framing which subsequent
viewers also experience as they consume images of con-
flict online.
Our study fits within a tradition of research that is
attuned to the study of media representations of war
and audience interpretations of them (Gillespie, Gow,
Hoskins, O’Loughlin, & Žveržhanovski, 2010). We use
the concept of ‘affective investments’ (Solomon, 2014)
to inform a framework of analysis that enables us to
explore how the content of social media posts is im-
bued with emotive content that provokes emotional re-
sponses from viewers. This approach is particularly help-
ful because, as the social theorist Ernesto Laclau notes,
when studying media, scholars often focus on the ‘form’
of media, or what is represented through language and
how this shapes identities and social action (Laclau, 2004,
p. 326). Such analyses overlook the ‘forces’ of media
discourse—the emotional and affective ways in which
representations actually appeal to audiences (Laclau,
2007, p. 111). As Ty Solomon notes in his work that builds
upon Laclau, ‘words alone often cannot carry the power
that they often have—the force of affect is needed to
explain how words resonate with audiences and have
political effects beyond their mere verbal utterance as
such’ (Solomon, 2014, p. 729). Consequently, media do
not simply have political and social significance because
of how they represent the world, but because of how
audiences feel about what they represent; how they be-
come affectively invested in the media representations
that they read, view, and hear. According to Solomon, af-
fective investments are:
Anchoring forces that bind subjects to their identi-
ties and particular kinds of discourses…affective in-
vestment is a key link between, on one hand, iden-
tities constructed in language [and media] and, on
the other hand, the ‘force’ that imbues…identities
with their potency and binding power. (Solomon,
2014, p. 729)
Such an understanding of affective investments has sev-
eral implications for the study of emotions,media, global
politics, and war. First, it suggests that the study of me-
dia and war should focus on how identities are repre-
sented and made potent through appeals to affect and
emotion. Second, it implies that studies should address
how audiences feel about the ways in which the world
is represented to them. This is especially pertinent in
the context of conflict, because, as Solomon’s research
demonstrates, the power of media does not solely lie in
the verbal and visual expressions of media themselves,
rather, these media ‘are politically consequential pre-
cisely because they touch upon—or are felt by audiences
to touch upon—a deeper nerve or ‘essence’ that such
[media] are believed by audience members to express’
(Solomon, 2014, p. 735). Thus, whilst we do not argue
that media representations cause specific audience reac-
tions, in stimulating audience views and interactions, on-
line videos act as discursive nodes; points of reference
for emotive engagement with the reported topic.
There are two important gaps within the literature
on affective investments and war which can both be ad-
dressed by attention to online content. First, despite the
shift in attention to ‘audiences’ affective investments’
(Solomon, 2014, p. 720), studies undertaken so far pro-
vide limited engagement with what audiences actually
think and feel about the media representations of war
that they view. To date, scholarship on affective invest-
ments and war remains focused on feelings expressed
by members of the public quoted in media articles
(Solomon, 2012, 2014) or on interviews that do not ac-
count for the specific media which audiences may have
engaged with (Holland, 2009). Second, studies of affec-
tive investments remain focused on traditional media,
and do not account for the changes in the media ecol-
ogy that followed the development of social media tech-
nologies that have had major implications for how war
is both represented and waged (Hoskins & O’Loughlin,
2010, 2015). Our article addresses these gaps by high-
lighting how socialmedia is used to representwar in such
a way that audiences not only feel affectively invested in
the use of armed force, but that they can record their
impressions for future audiences to experience together
with the initial source. Furthermore, we propose a frame-
work for studying how social media audiences express
emotions in the comments they post on social media
sites. Our framework builds upon scholarship on affec-
tive investments by drawing upon research onmedia and
communication (Lünenborg &Maier, 2018; Papacharissi,
2015), audience studies and conflict (Gillespie et al.,
2010; O’Loughlin, 2011; Pears, 2016) as well as work fo-
cusing on the importance of social media comments as
a data source for understanding war and security (Da
Silva & Crilley, 2017; Jackson, 2018; Shepherd & Hamil-
ton, 2016). This enables us to contribute to theorizing
and empirically studying affective investments in media
representations of war.
The study of affective investments in war is, however,
fraught with methodological issues. Emotions are ‘hard
to operationalize, hard to measure, and hard to isolate
from other factors’ (Mercer, 1996, p. 1), and understand-
ing their effects on politics and the legitimation of war is
difficult. Even with the concept of affective investments
providing a foundation for analysis we are still left with
important questions. For example, how canwe study and
systematically analyse howmedia representations ofwar
represent emotions? How can we understand what emo-
tions audiences feel when they view media representa-
tions of war? And finally, how canwe understand the link
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between the emotional content of media and the emo-
tions felt by audiences? We now seek to address these
questions by outlining a methodology for studying affec-
tive investments in war on social media sites.
3. Studying Affective Investments in War on Social
Media
In order to understand how social media is used to rep-
resent war in such a way that its viewers feel affec-
tively invested in the use of armed force, we propose
a three-step method to integrate analysis both of the
content of specific media; and of audience responses
to it. Our empirical material is taken from the coverage
of the Syrian conflict that the Russian state-backed in-
ternational broadcaster, RT (formerly Russia Today) up-
loaded to YouTube. The Syrian conflict is important for
understanding the contemporary dynamics ofmedia rep-
resentations of war and social media responses given
that social media has been one of the primary ways
in which people have found out news about the con-
flict (Lynch, Freelon, & Aday, 2014; Powers & O’Loughlin,
2015). What began as a revolutionary uprising against
the Assad regime soon splintered into a violent civil war
between competing factions including but not limited
to the Assad regime, the National Coalition of Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and various Salafi
Jihadi groups such as ISIS and al Nusra (Lister, 2015).
Over time, Syria transformed from ‘a significant regional
player into an arena in which amultitude of local and for-
eign players compete’ (Hokayem, 2013, p. 11), and both
traditional and social media have been integral to how
actors involved in the Syrian conflict have sought to gain
support for their cause. The Assad regime effectively pre-
vented professional media reporting of the revolution
by denying visas to international journalists and by tar-
geting the lives of those who remained (Khamis, Gold,
& Vaughn, 2012). The Syrian Opposition subsequently
used citizen journalists to communicate their message to
foreign audiences in hopes of achieving regime change
and their revolutionary goals (Crilley, 2017; Saleh, 2018).
At the same time, state funded international broadcast-
ers reported events in Syria in ways that aligned with
the foreign policy interests of their home states (Matar,
2014, 2017; Salama, 2012). Whilst the USA and other
‘Western’ states favoured the Syrian Opposition (Geis &
Schlag, 2017), Russia preferred to preserve Bashar al-
Assad’s control of Syria (Orttung & Nelson, 2018; for an
overview of international interests in Syria see Lynch,
2016, and Phillips, 2016).
For our theory-driven case construction (see Lai &
Roccu, 2019, p. 11) we focused on RT’s YouTube videos
on the Syrian conflict. For several reasons, these provide
a valuable case for studying emotion and affect in digital
visual representations of war, and audiences’ responses
to them. First, RT’s outputs reflect ‘the Russian gov-
ernment’s official position…one way or another’ (Putin,
2013), so its Syria reporting had to claim legitimacy for
foreign policy decisions that audiences knewwerewidely
condemned by the international community (Orttung &
Nelson, 2018, p. 3). The imperative to establish legiti-
macy is strongest during ‘critical turning points’ (Reus-
Smit, 2007, p. 44), so we honed down on two such junc-
tures marking the start and end of Russian intervention.
YouTube content was our specific focus, because interna-
tional broadcasters’ YouTube channels offer edited high-
lights that provide ‘unique insight’ into their brand iden-
tities and their attempts to set news agendas (al Nashmi,
North, Bloom, & Cleary, 2017, pp. 169–70); the platform
itself is central to RT’s dissemination strategy (al Nashmi
et al., 2017; Orttung & Nelson, 2018); and YouTube facil-
itates direct audience engagement via voting and com-
mentary functions. For practical reasons, we restricted
our analysis to the English-language international ser-
vice. Though the vast majority of audience comments
were made in English, we cannot accurately conclude
their origin. Some bore hallmarks of non-native speak-
ers (e.g., misuse of in/definite article); whilst others dis-
played perfect command of grammar and idiom.
3.1. Data Collection
We began by collecting data on RT’s YouTube playlists
about Syria. At the time of data collection, RT had 10
YouTube playlists of videos on Syria, only one of which
RT continued to update with new videos (see Table 1).
Where other playlists focused on specific actors,
places, or events, RT’s ‘Syrian conflict & war against
ISIS’ provided an overview of RT’s reports about the
Syrian conflict from 2015 to the present day. We there-
fore analysed the 610 videos on this playlist in order
to identify which videos reported the commencement
of Russian intervention and the withdrawal of Russian
forces from Syria. We found six videos explicitly reported
the announcement of Russian intervention in Syria, and
four reported the announcement that Russian forces
would be withdrawn (see Table 2).
From these videos we selected two for our analy-
sis: ‘Russian military forces start airstrikes against ISIS in
Syria’ (RT, 2015); and ‘BREAKING: Putin orders start of
Russian military withdrawal from Syria’ (RT, 2016). Both
of these videos are breaking news reports marking crit-
ical junctures at which RT announces a change in Rus-
sian foreign policy in Syria. Thus, they provide insight
into how RT claims legitimacy for Russian actions. Sec-
ond, they both provoked a significant quantity of audi-
ence responses in terms of views, comments, upvotes
and downvotes. Whilst RT’s YouTube videos gain on aver-
age 66000 views and 1015 responses (Orttung & Nelson,
2018, pp. 9–10), the first video we selected had over
sixteen times the number of average views and seven
times the responses of the average RT YouTube video.
The second video had around three times as many views
and responses as the average. These videos thereby pro-
vide a valuable source of comments to analyse the affec-
tive investments of the viewing audience. We analysed
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Table 1. RT playlists of videos on the Syrian conflict.
Playlist Title Number of videos Dates of first and last video published
Syrian conflict & war against ISIS 610 15 August 2015–still active
ISIS Uprising 349 20 August 2014–23 October 2017
Aleppo 145 1 August 2016–6 March 2017
Syria: Reports from the ground 94 27 January 2014–18 December 2015
RT reports from Syria 86 26 October 2015–13 November 2017
Russian Combat Cams 33 30 September 2015–21 July 2016
Russian warplane shot down at Syria-Turkey border 32 24 November 2015–24 November 2016
US missile strike against Syria 24 6 April 2017–1 May 2017
Russian Tu-154 plane crashes en route to Syria 14 24 December 2016–28 December 2016
RT crew under shelling, hit by anti-tank missile in Syria 5 24 November 2015–28 November 2015
Table 2. RT videos announcing Russian intervention (videos 1–6) and the withdrawal of Russian forces (videos 7–10).
ID Date Title Duration Views Comments Upvotes Downvotes
1 05/9/15 Are you Syrious? ‘Putin admits Russia’s 3:39 208179 1962 1400 191
aiding Syrian army in war’—western
media claim
2 15/9/15 ‘We need to abandon double standards 3:16 100432 738 1200 61
to combat ISIS’—Putin
3 18/9/15 Russia to consider sending troops to 1:36 19860 390 499 30
Syria if requested
4 30/9/15 Russian parliament approves use of 14:41 76233 583 729 39
military in Syria to fight ISIS
5 30/9/15 COMBAT CAM: First video of Russian 0:50 420682 1436 2000 132
airstrikes on ISIS in Syria
6 30/9/15 Russian military forces start airstrikes 13:49 1095221 2801 4100 342
against ISIS in Syria
7 14/3/16 BREAKING: Putin orders start of Russian 9:30 183345 2017 1600 140
military withdrawal from Syria
8 15/3/16 5 years of war in Syria: Russia 1:22 21244 247 399 29
withdraws its military forces from
Syria on conflict’s anniversary
9 15/3/16 FIRST VIDEO: Russian warplanes 0:39 141444 383 554 57
leaving airbase in Syria
10 26/10/17 Putin: 90% of Syria now liberated 0:57 13927 321 595 15
from terrorists
the entirety of the audio-visual information presented
in these videos (RT, 2015, 2016) using a combination of
techniques (see Section 3.2).
Next, we used a publicly available YouTube scraper to
gather all comments on these videos, before extracting
a manageable sample for analysis. To do so, we exported
all comments to a spreadsheet, and sorted them by
popularity. For each video, our sample consisted of the
100 most and 100 least popular comments, plus 100 se-
lected randomly. This enabled us to look at audience af-
fective investments that resonated more/less widely (in-
dicated by popularity) and to balance this with the gen-
eral picture. One potential limitation of the selection is
that RT may have moderated or deleted the most nega-
tive comments. However, our working assumption was
that the ‘upvotes’/’downvotes’ on comments present,
and the videos’ viewing figures would be reliable, given
the extent of YouTube’s efforts to tackle bots and spam
(Keller, 2018; YouTube, 2012, 2018). Our inclusion of
a random sample of comments was intended to fur-
ther mitigate against this eventuality. Furthermore, our
choice of manual analysis of these comments (see Sec-
tion 3.3) allowed us to exercise critical judgment on a
case-by-case basis.
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3.2. Analysing Audiovisual Representations
Automated sentiment analysis techniques can be ap-
plied to video content, however these are rarely geared
to tripartite combinations of textual, visual and audio
information, and have only limited capacity to take
into account connections between discrete utterances
(Poria, Cambria, Bajpai, & Hussain, 2017, p. 874). This
means that the overall narrative connections that de-
fine how wars and conflicts are presented can be lost.
Consequently, we developed a manual methodology for
our audio-visual analysis, which combined elements of
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA; Fairclough, 2010; Van
Dijk, 2011) and its application to visual media (Bleiker,
2018; Gillespie & Toynbee, 2006), as well as narrative
analysis. These techniques were explicitly geared to un-
covering relationships between knowledge and power;
how supposedly objective facts are discursively con-
structed; and how the construction of stories about
events and the actors involved in them can contribute to
this process. Given that RT’s coverage had to challenge
dominant knowledge claims about the conflict, and that
media texts work to ‘construct acceptable knowledge’
(Hansen, 2006, p. 8), we adapted Lene Hansen’s (2006,
pp. 73–83) three suggested foci for operationalising
CDA: temporal moment/s; subject/s of discourse; and
event/s. Two temporal moments were enshrined in our
selection of reporting of ‘critical junctures’. We there-
fore constructed two sets of research questions to es-
tablish how the ‘facts’ about identities and events in
the Syrian conflict were discursively constructed via RT’s
YouTube videos:
RQ1: Which actors and events are represented as be-
ing important in the conflict? How (and using what
normative assumptions) are they represented? How
are relationships between actors characterised?
RQ2:What, if any, affective or emotional stimuli are in-
volved in the representation of a) the actors involved;
b) specific events; and c) the conflict as a whole?
We began by identifying all of the actors that the videos
presented as being involved in the conflict. For each,
we examined four aspects of the audio-visual stimuli
used to represent them (see Table 3). These were the
two forms of visual information (written text; still and
moving images) and two forms of audio accompani-
ment (audio commentary; audio soundtracks). Where
these were used to convey urgency or that something
was unusual, we took this as a weak indicator of at-
tempted affective stimulation. Where representations
evoked a specific emotional orientation or conferred nor-
mative judgement (e.g., reference to an actor as legit-
imate/illegitimate), we took this as a strong indicator
of attempted affective stimulation, following research
that recognizes the interrelationship between emotions
and normative judgements (Davies, 2018, p. 208; Schlag,
2018, p. 219). We separately tallied these strong, weak
and absent attempts at affective stimulation, and analy-
sed the strong attempts further to determine the spe-
cific nature of the emotional claim. For example, visual
imagery including explosions would be categorised as
a strong attempt at affective stimulation, oriented to-
wards an emotion of peril, threat or fear. We closely ex-
amined which normative judgements and analytical con-
clusions were explicitly ascribed to actors/actions, and
which were embedded as if objective. This would in-
clude whether actors were referred to by their official
names (e.g., ‘government’, indicating legitimacy) or us-
ing normatively-inscribed terms (e.g., ‘regime’, indicat-
ing illegitimacy).
We complemented our CDA with narrative analysis
of how the development of the conflict was explicitly nar-
rated within the videos and/or inferred by what was im-
plied to have taken place off-screen (Crilley, 2015). We
did this by applying a method of timeline reconstruction
(Chatterje-Doody, 2014) in which an implied chronology
is reconstructed through attention to the time pegs and
links that are built into the telling of a particular story
(even though the story need not be told in a chrono-
logical order). This approach preserves important infor-
mation that is encoded through the overall integrated
content of a (visual) text, including judgements about
whether events merely happened subsequent to other
events, or directly because of them; and about which
actors’ actions were consequential in which conflict de-
velopments. Such information is routinely lost in analyti-
cal methods that split the subjects of study into smaller
segments or themes for analysis. Afterwards, we cate-
gorised each episode/event in the narrative according to
the schema outlined in Table 3.
Table 3. Schema of affective and emotional representations.
Written text Visual images Audio commentary Audio soundtrack
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3.3. Analysing Audience Affective Investments
Audience analysis is often based around measures of
exposure to media content. However, such data can-
not provide insights into audiences’ feelings about the
content that they consume. We must therefore con-
sider how audiences actually act in response to images
of war—for instance, when they choose to upload so-
cial media comments in response to media they view
(Crilley, 2015, pp. 332–333; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010,
p. 187). Whilst online commentators are not assumed to
be representative of wider audiences, their comments
remain discursive interventions, which reflect how me-
dia consumers make sense of contemporary world af-
fairs (Ampofo, Collister, & Chadwick, 2015; Da Silva &
Crilley, 2017), and can provide important evidence about
the emotions that they express (Crilley & Manor, 2018).
Automated forms of sentiment analysis are useful for
summarising the general reception that certain online
content receives from its audiences (Poria et al., 2017).
However, the contextual sparseness of social media com-
ments can reduce the reliability of such methods, and
they cannot assess audience reactions to specific aspects
of how content is presented (including the representa-
tions embedded within it). We therefore chose manual
analysis to bring together investigation both of media
content and of audiences’ feelings about that content,
undertaking deep, qualitative engagement with the rep-
resentations that conveyed emotion from source (media)
to target (audience).We paid close attention to the kinds
of representations that audiences chose to express their
opinions of the viewed content, especially those convey-
ing an emotional response.
We approached our coding and analysis inductively.
Given that RT’s videos served to claim legitimacy for
Russia’s intervention in Syria, we sought to ascertain how
far RT’s account of the conflict and its characterisation
of actors resonated with audiences. We began by cod-
ing audience comments on the basis of the analytical
claims that they implied, according to whether they sup-
ported, opposed, or expressed neutral/unclear views on
Russian intervention. So as not to impose the concep-
tual framework of affective investments onto the empir-
ical data, we coded the comments separately for emo-
tion. Since emotions are complex and online comments
can be brief and idiosyncratic, we kept our three coding
categories for emotion broad. We focused on: positive
emotions (including expressions of joy, excitement, re-
spect, pride); negative emotions (including expressions
of anger, sadness, disgust, confusion); and neutral or un-
clear emotions.Within this analysis of audience emotion,
we took as indicators of emotion the use of normatively-
loaded language and judgements; expressions of an ex-
treme degree (e.g., use of superlatives); employment of
either emojis (i.e., text faces) or acronyms for emotion
(e.g., LOL); and the use of swearing.
4. Affective Investment in the Syrian Conflict
Our analysis revealedmany affective and emotional stim-
uli within RT’s coverage of the conflict in Syria. These
were used primarily to express the legal and moral
justifications for Russian intervention. They were em-
bedded as the background to reporting, via casually-
ingrained normative references to the different actors.
On one side, referred to in formal language, were the
‘Syrian government’ that requested Russian assistance;
the ‘Damascenes’ who supported it; the ‘Russian parlia-
ment’ that approved air strikes; the named senior politi-
cians (especially President Putin) involved in decisive de-
velopments; and the UN Security Council, which gave its
multilateral backing to peace resolutions ultimately fa-
cilitated by Russia. On the other side, couched in nor-
mative terms, were ‘anti-government militants’; oppo-
sitional ‘groups like Islamic State’ (IS); ‘terrorists’; ‘for-
eign fighters’; Western politicians motivated by ‘regime
change’; and their military forces, whose interventions
had increased chaos on the ground.
These emotive representations were packaged
within a very clear narrative of the evolution of the
conflict, which was layered through a combination of
visual, textual and audio stimuli, many of which had
overtly affective elements. These affective stimuli in-
cluded dramatic red and black colour ways; visuals of
fire, explosions and military hardware; and audio sound-
tracks featuring gunshots, explosions andmortar attacks.
According to the narrative of the Syrian conflict that RT
chose to portray in their YouTube videos, initial civil un-
rest spiralled out of control, creating a chaotic environ-
ment that allowed groups like IS to thrive. Motivated by
regime change, Western powers intervened militarily,
but this escalated tensions, and contributed to making
IS a global threat. Russian armed intervention into this
conflict situation came at the request of the legitimate
Syrian government, and in response to the chaos on the
ground. It was legally and morally legitimate; targeted;
short in duration; and effective. At the withdrawal an-
nouncement in particular, the central role of Putin in
achieving this ‘successful’ intervention was highlighted.
Our analysis of social media comments on these
videos revealed that audiences largely accepted both
RT’s narrative of the conflict and its characterisations of
the key actors involved. To be clear, this is not evidence
that the videos caused such opinions, merely that they
stimulated their expression as such. On the 300 com-
ments that we analysed on each of the two videos of
breaking news in Syria, 71% (n = 213) and 60% (n = 179)
respectively were supportive of the Russian interven-
tion and/or suggested that it had been a success; 17%
(n= 51) and 18% (n= 56) were opposed to it and/or sug-
gested that it had been a failure. Just 12% (n = 36) and
22% (n = 65) were neutral or expressed no clear senti-
ment towards the intervention. Themain swing between
the commencement andwithdrawal announcements ap-
pears to be a slight reduction in support for the inter-
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vention, and increase in uncertainty/neutrality. This may
be due to the wealth of alternative information available
at the time of the withdrawal showing the situation not
to be fully resolved. Nonetheless, negative comments at
both points were similarly low.
Audiences of the two videos were much more likely
to express an emotion of some kind in their commen-
tary (81% [n = 244] and 77% [n = 230] respectively),
than to remain neutral or to express no emotion (19%
[n = 56] and 23% [n = 70]). Emotion-laden comments
on the first video were almost evenly split between posi-
tive (n = 124) and negative (n = 120) emotions; whereas
on the second video the balance was more towards pos-
itive (n = 144) rather than negative (n = 86) emotions.
Yet, we have already established that this audience was
overwhelmingly supportive of the intervention at both
points. As it happens, the prevalence of emotional com-
mentary from audiences was not related to their assess-
ment of the intervention per se. Rather, it reflects the
audience’s affective investments (both positive and neg-
ative) in the identities represented within RT’s cover-
age. The positive/negative split on the first video repre-
sented emotions expressed towards Russian actors; and
towards oppositional ‘terrorists’. As will be shown in de-
tail below, the positively-weighted emotional responses
to the second video ultimately reflected strong affective
buy-in to the idea of a legitimate, effective andmasculine
Russian military.
Our qualitative analysis of audience comments re-
vealed that the affective investments that audiences
displayed strongly reflected RT’s audio-visual represen-
tations of the Syrian conflict. Four key affective in-
vestments recurred: mistrust of global institutions (per-
ceived within a conspiratorial framework); anger at US
foreign policy; pride and gratitude towards Russia; and a
heavily gendered understanding of Russia’s intervention.
Table 4 exemplifies how audience comments on the
videos replicate both RT’s narrative of conflict devel-
opments and its characterisation of core actors. Sig-
nificantly, however, it is via affective investments in
core identities that commenters express their overall as-
sessment of the conflict. These include negative senti-
ments about ‘loser’ NATO; the ineffective USA; and the
‘terrorists’ to be destroyed. Positive sentiments centre
around the effective ‘real men’ of Russia, and particu-
larly the personalised figure of ‘Mr Putin’. Notably, as
demonstrated in the final row, commentators frequently
couched these identities specifically in terms of mili-
tarised masculinity, mapping gendered characteristics
onto subjects and events at the moments of both com-
mencement and withdrawal announcements.
Our article has proposed a new methodological
toolkit to further the empirical study of affective in-
vestments in images of war—linking media sources to
their audience. Our ensuing analysis of social media com-
ments demonstrated that audiences were highly likely to
express emotion in their responses to images of war, and
that this emotion could be either positive or negative in
nature. However, rather than being expressed in general
terms as responses to the conflict itself, emotional en-
gagements were closely linked to audiences’ understand-
ings of the actors involved in the conflict. Our empirical
study indicates, therefore, that affective investment in
the identities represented on-screen was a core compo-
nent of the force with which the images of war were im-
bued. Neither video described the USA as homosexual
and feminine, or Russia as a masculine ‘real man’. Rather,
this was how commenters expressed their feelings about
the identities of the USA and Russia, and which bled into
their assessments of the conflict. Individuals were affec-
tively invested in the identity of a masculine, collective,
effective, anti-terrorist Russia as opposed to a feminine,
imperial, and out of control ‘West’ in Syria. Our analysis
suggests that the concept of affective investment is cru-
cial for helping to understand howaudiencesmake sense
of images of war, and how they relate to the audio-visual
stimuli within which such conflict is represented.
5. Conclusions
In recent years, scholars have become increasingly aware
of the importance of emotion and affect for understand-
Table 4. Examples of audience comments displaying affective investments in Russian military force in Syria.
Affective Investment Comments (Commencement) Comments (Withdrawal)
Mistrust of global NATO = LOSER Nice move Mr Putin, keep the globalist
institutions NWO trash guessing and confused…
Anger at US USA interference in Iraq created Russia—bombs destroys the shit out of
foreign policy Terrorists, while Russia interference terrorists and pulls out USA—bombs
in Syria will end terrorism. people left and right, replace governments
and stay occupying countries for decades
Pride and gratitude Thank God for Putin. I don’t even believe in Great Job, Russia!
towards Russia God, but it sure seems like he was sent by
a good force to stop this fucking insanity.
Gendered understanding US gays can go home now to their That’s how you do it boys. Get in,
of Russia’s intervention boyfriends, real men are taking over :) get the job done, get out.
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ing world politics. Yet, there remain significant concep-
tual (Lünenborg & Maier, 2018, p. 1) and methodologi-
cal difficulties for studying emotions, particularly in the
context of war and conflict (Åhäll & Gregory, Chapter 17).
These include the recurrent debates aboutwhether emo-
tions and politics should be studied as elite-led ‘top-
down’ processes, or as being led from the ‘bottom-up’ di-
rection of the individual (Delori, 2018; Schlag, 2018). Yet,
how can we make any inferences about how audiences
respond to images of war if we are not prepared to en-
gagewith both the content of those representations, and
with audiences’ reception of, and responses to them?
In this article, we have offered a way forward for
investigating emotion and affect from media source to
their audiences. Specifically, we have argued that one
effective way to understand how audiences make sense
of images of war is to engage directly with the reactions
they express towards such images on social media. Social
media comments are particularly instructive, since they
represent audience members’ direct engagement with
the images they view. We cannot be sure of an actor’s
internal motivations, nor can we necessarily pick apart
how an actor’s emotional responses feed into their per-
ceptions of what is a rational judgment (Mercer, 2006).
Nonetheless, social media comments constitute an ob-
servable, empirical response to online content which can
provide some insight into how such content is received
(Van Dijck & Poell, 2013).
Our approach to audience understandings of war
is informed by the concept of ‘affective investments’
(Solomon, 2014), whereby media content stimulates
emotional responses in its viewers by anchoring them
to the identities and subjectivities it portrays. Our em-
pirical analysis of breaking news videos and of audience
reactions to them indicated that affective investments
were crucial in how audiences interpreted and engaged
with images of war. For, emotional responses to images
of war were far more common than neutral ones. Yet,
the character of such emotion did not necessarily corre-
spond to the character of an audience’s judgment about
the overall nature of the conflict on display. It was not
simply the images of war themselves that provoked an
emotional reaction, but rather, the representations of
the identities of the key actors involved with that con-
flict. These were related to how audiences assessed par-
ticular events.
It is becoming increasingly evident that images ofwar
achieve their power amongst audiences as a direct re-
sult of the ways in which identities conveyed within im-
ages resonate with their audiences. Yet, to date there
has been limited scholarly attention to bringing together
empirical analysis of media representations of conflict,
and audience responses to them—or to developing the
methodological toolkit through which such a synergy
may be made viable. With this preliminary study, we
have provided somemethodological suggestions for how
the empirical study of affective investments in images of
war—from media source to target audience—might be
taken forward, and offered some foundations for future
study of how links betweenmedia content and audience
responses might be made.
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